Thomas
T. Scambos, Jr.
Chief
Justice John Roberts
1
APPLICATION TO THE CHIEF
JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT UNDER RULE 22
The
undersigned, Petitioner in Case Number 09-323, in which the Petition for Certiorari has been denied, does hereby
make this Application to the Justices of the United States Supreme Court in a
final appeal for justice in these matters.
This application is particularly relevant to the Chief Justice, as the
individual justice responsible for monitoring the events occurring in the
federal courts within the Fourth Circuit.
The
Petitioner in this case has been treated in an egregiously unjust manner by the
members of the lower court judiciary. He
was fraudulently and unlawfully threatened by the magistrate with indeterminate
imprisonment under color of law during the district court hearing held in this
case, and was subsequently extortionately ordered
by the Magistrate under color of office, to turn over
property to the federal government, in an obviously prejudicially engineered predetermined
outcome to the IRS Summons enforcement hearing.
The statutory jurisdiction of the district
courts to enforce internal revenue Summons is identified in Title 26 U.S.C.
Sections 7402(b) and 7604(a). Title 26
U.S.C. Section 7604(a) plainly states:
§ 7604. Enforcement of summons
(a)
Jurisdiction of district court
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to
appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the
(emphasis added)
And Title 26 U.S.C.
Section 7402(b) similarly states:
§ 7402. Jurisdiction of district courts
….
(b) To enforce summons
If any person is summoned under the
internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or
other data, the district court of
the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found
shall have jurisdiction by appropriate
process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books,
papers, or other data.
(emphasis added)
These statutes both make it absolutely clear
that the jurisdiction of the district court over the enforcement of an internal
revenue Summons is only established by the accomplishment of the
specified “appropriate process”. Both of these statutes invoke the same
requirement of “appropriate process”,
made necessary for the district court to hold jurisdiction.
That requirement of “appropriate process” cannot be accomplished unless all of the
specific requirements of the controlling statutes regarding the issuance,
service, and enforcement of an I.R.S. Summons are meticulously followed and
obeyed by the
The
authority to Summons books and records is of course established in Title 26
U.S.C. § 7602. However, the
“appropriate process” controlling the
specific lawful application of those powers within the various Subtitles of the Title 26 Code, is specified in the code
sections immediately following Section 7602, in Title 26 U.S.C. Sections
7603 through 7613.
This
case is marked by a whole series of inappropriate events, every single
one of which constituted the destruction of the “appropriate process” required by law, necessary for the district
court to subsequently hold jurisdiction to uphold any action of the magistrate
or to enforce the disputed Summons, while evidencing and making very obvious
the absolutely inappropriate
behavior, in fact unlawful acts, committed
by the district court Magistrate in this case, which have simply been
“white-washed” in a cover-up of the Magistrate’s errors perpetrated by the district
court bench.
To
briefly recount for the members of this honorable Supreme Court, the entire
slate of unlawful and inappropriate
acts committed by the Magistrate, the district court judge, and the I.R.S.
Revenue Agent in the proceedings of this case:
1. The Revenue Agent exceeded the authority of the written law
granted to her employment position under Title 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a)[1],
to serve a Summons only under
Subtitle E, within an investigation pertaining
to commodities subject to tax. The Revenue
Agents knew beforehand that Petitioner
is not, and has never been, engaged in any activity under Subtitle E, pertaining
to commodities subject to tax.
2. The Revenue Agent failed the statutory requirements of
law under Title 26 U.S.C § 7608(b)1, to be a “criminal investigator of the Intelligence Division” who is authorized thereunder to serve a
Summons under Subtitle A, within an investigation pertaining to Subtitle A personal
income tax, rather than “pertaining to
commodities subject to tax” under Subtitle E.
3. The Revenue Agent misrepresented facts and circumstances in her
Affidavit, stating that she was investigating
alleged “liability” for tax, but could not identify any established or even
alleged liability in the Petitioner’s name (under Title 26 U.S.C. Sections 1461
or 1463[2])
at the hearing, and was not able to
identify any other statute in the U.S. Code under which liability for
tax in the Petitioner’s name might arise, or be alleged to be established
or exist. The Revenue Agent lied in her
Affidavit about statutory “liability” for tax in the Petitioner’s name. There is none that exists to investigate and,
by previous correspondence with Petitioner, this was a known fact to the
Revenue Agent.
4. The Revenue Agent was not
legitimately investigating a known, or even suspected, true or statutory
liability for federal tax as sworn in her Affidavit, but was simply improperly using the Summons power to go fishing
for earnings upon which to allege federal tax would be owed, once identified. The
Revenue Agent has never alleged any
federal tax is actually owed by the Petitioner, or that any liability
to investigate, actually exists, either
in statute or in Petitioner’s name; or that Petitioner even engages in any
taxable activity under Subtitle E that she is authorized to investigate! This constituted an unlawful misuse of the
Summons power by the Revenue Agent, which power, under Section 7608(a), is not
legitimately used by a Revenue Agent, authorized
to act under Title 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a), to
go fishing for dollars OUTSIDE of
Subtitle E.
5. The Revenue Agent, in committing these improper acts, and violating the granted limited authority of her employment position
and office under Section 7608(a), violated
and therefore destroyed the required
“appropriate process” as specified
in Title 26 U.SC. § 7608(b), made
necessary under Title 26 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a) and 7402(b) for the district
court to subsequently hold jurisdiction over the enforcement of the I.R. Summons. The
Agent’s actions thus destroyed the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate and the district court to subsequently address
the matter, or enforce the I.R. Summons.
6. At the district court hearing before
the Magistrate, these questions of jurisdiction were raised by the
Petitioner. The Magistrate however,
declared he did not understand the
issues and arguments presented at the hearing by the Petitioner, but nevertheless, immediately ruled against
them anyway, on the spot, without further consideration or investigation of the
raised objection or identified jurisdictional issues. The Magistrate clearly said to the
Petitioner: “I don’t understand you”, and then
ruled immediately against those arguments which he had just declared he did NOT UNDERSTAND, without making any
further attempt to do so. Now
there’s justice for you, the Magistrate summarily rules: “I don’t understand
you, and therefore you are wrong!”. Is this the supremacy of REASON ? Is
this the rule of LAW ? Is this the proper
exercise of lawful judicial authority within the court and its proceedings? Obviously
not.
7. The Magistrate then criminally tampered with the transcript of
the Hearing, unlawfully deleting that
portion of it where he had declared he didn’t understand the arguments
presented by the Petitioner at the Hearing.
The Magistrate criminally altered
the audio record of the hearing to
attempt to cover up his improper and obviously prejudicial behavior towards the
Petitioner in immediately ruling on arguments admittedly not
understood. The tampering with, and deletion of those statements from, the audio
transcript of the hearing was obviously an illegal, criminal act, intentionally
committed by the Magistrate to cover up his improper and prejudicial behavior
towards Petitioner, and was an act that was egregiously prejudicial to the Petitioner’s
rights, his case, the requirements of due process at law, the Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the Rules of the Court itself. This sort of judicial fraud
violates all sense of human decency, morality, and integrity, and destroys
utterly any pretense of judicial impartiality.
Is this now American Justice ?
8. Next, the Magistrate failed and refused to write any report
or recommendation as required by law
under Title 28 U.S.C. § 636[3],
thus violating the additional appropriate
process required of the Magistrate to preserve the subsequent jurisdiction
of the district court. Title 28 U.S.C. §
636 clearly provides the true authority and lawful duties of the Magistrate
judges in preliminary district court hearings.
The failure to adhere to the requirements of the appropriate process
specified in statute to write a report, further destroyed completely the subsequent jurisdiction of the district court to
address this matter.
9. The Magistrate then erroneously
invoked and misapplied an inappropriate corporate precedent, United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48 (1964), to attempt to control the production of the
Petitioner’s personal books and
records and testimony. The Petitioner is
not a corporation without 5th Amendment rights to consider (see Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538 (1911)), before being
ordering to testify or produce records in a potentially criminal investigation
that, under Title 26 U.S.C. § 7608(b) is supposed to be
conducted by a “criminal investigator of the Intelligence
Division”. The fact that only a “criminal investigator” is authorized by statute to Summons books
and records and testimony within a Subtitle A investigation of liability for
payment of the Subtitle A personal income tax, makes absolutely obvious the clear
presence of the Petitioner’s Constitutional 5th Amendment Right to a
protection from compelled self-incrimination in this Summons enforcement
process.
10. Then, at the preliminary district
court Hearing the Magistrate improperly threatened
the Petitioner with indeterminate imprisonment if he did not comply with
the order of the court being issued by him (the Magistrate). This constituted
an attempt to unlawfully intimidate the Respondent under color of office, as the Magistrate
has no authority under these circumstances to either threaten imprisonment or to issue and enforce his orders as
final Orders of the district court, which he improperly and unlawfully did in
this matter, under both “color of law”, and again, “color of office”.
11. Magistrates are not permitted to issue final Orders of the District Courts, Internal Revenue Code restricts the power to
enforce a § 7602 summons to the district courts. See
I.R.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a); United States
v. Wisnowski, 580
F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1978), reh. denied, 585 F.2d 521. A
summons enforcement Order is a final dispositive and appealable order, Reisman
v. Caplin, 375
12. The Magistrate then improperly tried
to take advantage of the pro se litigant,
and failed to provide the required Notice of special appeal rights and process
as further required by controlling precedential ruling. See Wells
v.
13. “Color
of law” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as:
“The appearance or semblance, without
the substance, of legal right. Misuse of
power … but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful
authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of an official to be done
“under color of any law”, the unlawful acts must be done while such official is
purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his official duties; that
is to say, the unlawful acts must consist in an abuse or misuse of power which
is possessed by the official only because he is an official; and the unlawful
acts must be of such a nature or character, and be committed under such circumstances,
that they would not have occurred but for the fact that the person committing
them was an official then and there exercising his official powers outside the
bounds of lawful authority. 42 USCA § 1983.
14. The Magistrate clearly acted under color of law
when he committed fraud by tampering
with the audio transcripts of the testimony, and in unlawfully ordering
testimony and evidence to be compelled
from the Petitioner by allegedly final Order of the district court, without
further review by the true district court bench, and without the Magistrate giving
Notice to the Petitioner as required of appeal rights or special
process. These colorable acts were committed
by the Magistrate while he deceitfully,
improperly and illegally violated the written requirements of the law, and the
controlling applicable case precedents, while he himself was committing
prohibited acts under both color of law and color of office.
15. “Color
of office” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as:
“Pretense of official right to do act made by one who has no such right … An
act under color of office is an act of an officer who claims authority to do
the act by reason of his office when the office does not confer on him any such
authority…”
16. “Extortion” is defined by Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th Edition) as:
“The obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 18
U.S.C.A. § 871 et seq;
§ 1951”
17. The Magistrate clearly committed extortion
under color of office in unlawfully
threatening to imprison the Petitioner unless personal property was turned over,
because he has no authority to so act
granted to him under Title 28 U.S.C Section 636.
18. The
Magistrate was also clearly acting under color of law and color of office by pretending to be personally empowered to
issue orders as final Orders of the District Court when Section 636 clearly
does not grant that power to him as a Magistrate under the circumstances
defining this dispute.
19. These colorable acts were committed by
the Magistrate, who deceitfully, improperly and in fact illegally, fraudulently
misrepresented his true legal authority to the Petitioner, but which authority
was not actually possessed by his magisterial
office to exercise under either the circumstances, or the law, nor under
the true controlling line of applicable case precedents. (See paragraphs 11 – 12 above, and 21 below).
20. The Magistrate exceeded his lawful
authority under Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 by issuing and enforcing his personal orders
as a final Order of the district court,
rather than writing a report and
recommendation as required by (the above identified) law, and giving notice
to the Petitioner of 10 days to object to the Magistrate’s report.
21. The
extension of the Magistrate’s powers are not allowed. A district court may not permit, and the parties may not consent to, extension
of the power of the Magistrate to
enter final judgment in an area where such power is restricted to the district courts. United States Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Bishop, 598 F.2d 408
(5th Cir. 1979). Therefore, the Magistrate himself completely destroyed, by his acts, any subsequent jurisdiction of the district
court, to subsequently rule in these matters.
22. This conflicting line of controlling precedent
have been erroneously and wrongfully ignored
or overlooked by the district court bench, and has not been addressed by
the Circuit bench members in their Opinion,
or, now, by the Supreme Court in its denial of the Petition for Certiorari.
23. The Magistrate and the Revenue Agent
clearly violated the required appropriate
process necessary under the statutes for the District Court to have and
hold jurisdiction to subsequently rule.
24. Subsequently, after appeal to the district
court of the Magistrate’s unlawful Order, the district court Judge violated the
Rules of the Court himself, in order to attempt to prejudicially dismiss the
timely filed appeal of the Petitioner.
25. The true
controlling precedents were well known
to the district court as they are evidenced on the record of the
proceedings in the original erroneous dismissal Order of the district court Judge,
improperly dismissing the Petitioner’s appeal of the Magistrate’s actions and
“order”.
26. When a violation of the Rules of the
court was identified by the Petitioner and argued in Objection, the District
Court Judge rescinded the erroneous dismissal of the Petitioner’s appeal, but then
chose to begin inventing lies in a fraudulent
story of false construction that was illegally subsequently used by the
district court to replace the true facts of the case as already evidenced on
the record of the proceedings.
27. To wit: the court ruled that even though the
Magistrate wasn’t himself allowed to issue Orders of the district court under
the instant circumstances, and even though those unlawful Orders had already
been improperly enforced on the Petitioner, the Judge was going to pretend the “order” issued by the Magistrate was
really a report, and that now, after
the “order” had already been enforced on the Petitioner, the Court would
allow Objections; AFTER THE FACT, as though enforcement had not already occurred, in
an apparently new, absurd district
court GAME (or fraud), called: “LETS PRETEND IT NEVER
HAPPENED” !
28. Of course, this “construction” of
events, this pretense, was an absurd
fraud perpetrated by the district court itself, in that it constituted a clear false construction of events that never
actually occurred at all! Since when do
judges get to make up lies and false stories to be used in place of the facts
of the case as actually evidenced and recorded on the record of the proceedings
of the court? Is this now American
Justice, BY FRAUD?
29. The Magistrate clearly and obviously,
intentionally broke the law in order to attempt to ensure the government’s
prejudicial, predetermined victory, and the district court despicably joined him,
in attempting to cover-up of the crimes committed by the Magistrate, and effectively
began committing them itself, through the clear abuse of its discretion. And now the Fourth Circuit, and apparently the
Supreme Court itself, appear to join the
conspiracy to cover up the crimes and misdeeds of the members of the lower
court judiciary. Are you really all aware of everything that
has occurred in this case, and are you actually going to try and approve it?
30. The District Court bench never had
jurisdiction to rule in this case because of the identified destruction of the
required “appropriate process” by
both the Magistrate and the Revenue Agent.
31. The district court Judge however,
also refused to address the obvious jurisdictional issues identified, and he
refused to address the problematic, precedential issues raised in the written objections
allowed to be submitted by the Petitioner.
The district court allowed the Petitioner’s objections, in fact invited them, BUT THEN REFUSED TO
ADDRESS THEM, pretending rather that they didn’t exist and hadn’t actually been
made. ALL 50 OF THEM.
32. The District Court Judge further refused to follow the true and well
established controlling line of precedents regarding the limited authority
and true statutory powers of the Magistrate identified by the Petitioner in
Objection, which the district court judge himself had properly identified in
his attempted initial dismissal of the appeal (see paragraphs 11-12, 21 above).
33. The District Court Judge then erroneously
and improperly invoked another inapplicable
corporate precedent, First National
Bank of Atlanta, 628 F.2d at 873, to reverse his
previous holding, in order to be sure the government would again secure the
predetermined outcome of another court victory. However,
that precedent also cannot be
legitimately applied to the circumstances present in this dispute to
control them, because the circumstances in that case were so substantially different
from the circumstances present in the instant dispute, as to make that case
irrelevant as a precedent to this one.
34. In the First National case the erroneous and improper “order” of the Magistrate
was discovered before that Magistrate’s “order” was enforced as a final Order of the
district court, and before testimony was compelled, and before books and
records were compelled to be turned over to the government. Unlike the present case where the
Magistrate’s improper “order” had
already been enforced when the impropriety of the Magistrate’s “order” was
identified.
35. Dissimilar
facts and circumstances are not legitimately used by honorable courts and
judges to control and dispose of dissimilar disputes.
36. Finally, the Circuit Court inexplicably
required the Petitioner to pay the appeal fees twice for this case.
Petitioner was made to pay the appeal fee of the Circuit Court two times,
in order for the case to be heard just once.
37. Finally, the 4th Circuit
Court, and now the Supreme Court itself, both refuse to address the clear and
obvious conflict between the two conflicting lines of precedential authority invoked
by the district court judge under First
Nat’l in ignoring the actual ruling
in law in that case and invoking and
following the error. In fact, he erroneously reverses his own
correct holding in the rescinded dismissal Order, in order to again ensure a
final outcome in the dispute that favors the government. I repeat, the judge actually reverses
his own correct ruling and cite of true controlling precedential lines of
authority, in order to again make sure that ultimately the predetermined favorable outcome for the government is secured by
the court, at any cost.
SUMMARY
All
of these improper acts, some plainly illegal,
were committed by the judges handing this case in the lower courts. The jurisdiction
of the district court was destroyed, several
times over by the actions of both the Revenue Agent and the Magistrate; the
controlling laws were blatantly violated;
false construction and fraudulent lies were invented by the court judiciary and
substituted in place of the facts evidenced on the record of the court; and all
the higher courts have to say is “Affirmed,
per curiam”, and “Petition Denied”.
Would you accept that, if this had all
happened to you?
Is
this now American justice? Administered by fraud, by mischief, by corrupt act, by
intimidation, by threats of incarceration, under color of law, under color of
office? Do you think this type of
behavior by the judges earns the respect of We the People when we encounter it
in the official actions of the federal courts?
Or does it rightfully earn and deserve, only our contempt?
This
sort of obvious and insidious corruption within the judiciary, amounting to a
clear and obvious conspiracy against the American People, and their Rights,
brings to mind a familiar paragraph from the Declaration of Independence:
“But
when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism,”
When it becomes obvious, as stated by Thomas Jefferson, that: “Single
acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of the day; but a series of oppressions, … pursued unalterably through every change
of ministers too plainly proves a
deliberate, systematic plan of reducing us to slavery.”, then the
People are justified in resistance through whatever measures are necessary to
restore a dejure governance.
This
facts of this case, as recounted above, are
clear evidence of both corruption and
a conspiracy in the lower courts, perpetrated
by the Magistrates and certain district court judges to prejudicially predetermine the outcome of all I.R.S. Summons enforcement hearings, regardless of the true facts, regardless of the law, regardless of the
evidence and true circumstances of the matter, regardless of the Rules of
Evidence, regardless of the duties and the Rules of the Court, regardless of
the rulings in the proper line of true controlling case precedents, regardless
of the severity of the errors made, and, even apparently, regardless of the
severity of any actual crimes committed by the Magistrates, like tampering
with the transcript, threatening people under color of office and
extorting property from citizens under color of law; and regardless of the protections
and prohibitions proscribed by the Constitution of the United States of
America addressing such behavior.
Such
patent disregard for the written law
by the federal magistrates and judges themselves is shameful and despicable, and deserves nothing but our contempt. Criminal behavior, despicably engaged in by
misguided members of the lower judiciary, should not be tolerated within the
American judicial system by the higher courts, and certainly, irregardless of the higher courts, will not
stand long in the light of day once exposed.
The Magisterial justices evidently no longer understand the concept
of judicial impartiality, nor take serious their Oath to uphold the
Constitution of the
This
blatant corruption demonstrated through this predetermined prejudicial
proclivity to favor the government at every turn, and in every outcome, in I.R.S.
Summons enforcement proceedings, routinely practiced now by the lower court
Magistrates all across
The
higher judiciary’s failure to constrain its own members and uphold the
Constitution in a timely manner, is rapidly tolling the American People’s patience
with, and respect for, these federal Courts.
The federal courts are rapidly losing the respect of the American People
and the longer these improper behaviors remain unaddressed, the more respect they are going to lose,
until only a few people in America will care any more about what they say, because we will all know that the only real justice
that comes in America any more, is the Justice that comes from God. The higher courts know that they invite violence
and anarchy by their refusal to constrain, reign in, and halt the unlawful acts
of the members of the federal judiciary in the lower courts. Recognition of this was most eloquently
stated by Justice Brandeis in his Dissenting Opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 19
F. (2d) 842, 848, 850, affirmed (1928), which I am sure you are familiar with:
“Decency, security and
liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands
to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious.
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that, in the administration of the
criminal law, the end justifies the means -- to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.”
(emphasis added)
Clearly
these same fundamental principles of justice must apply, and be applied, to all
of the court’s proceedings, both criminal and civil, and not just the criminal. When
the federal Courts repeatedly deliver prejudicial, predetermined outcomes, that
provide unlawful powers on a carte blanche basis to the U.S. government and its
agencies to exercise; to operate criminally under color of law, under color of
office; to lie, to cheat, to defraud; to unlawfully intimidate and threaten; to extort, to rob and to steal property and
Rights from the good American People, all in the name of tax only, under color
of law, while acting only under color office; then obviously indeed,
they (those courts) have vacated their
position of moral authority and have truly become the problem in America, and
no longer can be relied upon by the American People as an impartial forum
providing honest and dejure solutions to our legal disputes with the government;
meaning other mechanisms must be found
to serve as such, because as it was so eloquently pointed out Justice Brandeis:
“If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”
This
specific case herein appealed, is a complete and total judicial sham, and the conduct
of the
This
case is clear evidence of an obviously biased and corrupt judiciary attempting
to unlawfully cover up the extent of the Magistrate’s misbehavior and corruption,
and the prejudicially predetermined nature of the outcome of the IRS Summons
enforcement hearing.
It
is also now quite apparent and clear to me that the federal courts, including
both the circuit courts and now apparently the Supreme Court itself, are all willing
to cover up these colorable acts of the magistrate and district court, in order
to try and prevent this colorable, defacto method of
operation, being routinely employed in the district courts all across America,
from being discovered, exposed, and halted once and for all.
If
the Revenue Agents are going to be allowed to violate the law; if the federal
judiciary of the lower courts is also
not going to obey the written law; if the district courts are going to be allowed to threaten, to
extort, to lie, to cheat, to defraud, to deprive rights and extort property
from the good American People, in the name
of tax only, under color of law and Office; and IF the higher
appeals circuit and Supreme courts are not going to prevent or interfere with those
lower court magistrates and judges, and prevent them from engaging in this sort
of obviously corrupt and improper behavior, thereby effectively supporting and
joining in with the conspiracy to intimidate WE the PEOPLE and violate our rights;
then WE The PEOPLE will have no other option left to take, but in the future to
rely on the 2nd Amendment to defend our own private property and Constitutional
rights ourselves, from the unlawful
transgressions of both the lawlessness
of our neighbors, and that of our own government
as well.
It
is hard for me to believe that is really what this Court wants to encourage and
promote.
CONCLUSION
It
would appear from the events that have transpired in the instant matter that the
lower courts no longer care about
the written law, or the written
limitations of the statutes imposed on the powers granted to the federal
government to be legitimately
exercised. They appear to no longer believe in the rule of law,
the proper invocation of applicable precedent, or the constitutional philosophy
providing for a representative government of limited, specifically enumerated powers that are written in law,
and that are not to be exceeded, abused or misused by members of the
government or its employees in carrying out their lawful duties. And worst of all, the higher courts as well, seem to be just fine with that abdication of
duty by the lower courts! But, as
it was so plainly stated by Justice Field in his Opinion in the Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co.
case:
“As stated by counsel: ‘There is no such thing in the theory of our
national government as unlimited power
of taxation … There are limitations,
as he justly observes, of its powers arising out of the essential nature of all
free governments; there are reservations
of individual rights, without which
society could not exist, and which
are respected by every [legitimate] government. The right of taxation is subject to these limitations.’ Citizens' Savings Loan Ass'n v.
(emphasis [and bracketing]
added)
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The foregoing considered,
the pro se Petitioner prays this
Honorable Court will grant this extraordinary appeal by special application,
and address this matter and correct the improper behavior of the members of the
lower court judiciary as appropriate, and make Petitioner whole again.
Respectfully submitted,
_____________________________
Thomas T. Scambos, Jr.
Petitioner, pro se
(540) 937-3098
Attached Exhibits:
§
7608. Authority of internal revenue enforcement officers.
(a) Enforcement of subtitle E and other
laws pertaining to liquor, tobacco, and firearms
Any investigator, Officer, or other
internal {Job Title} by whatever term designated, whom the Secretary
charges with the duty of enforcing any
of the criminal, seizure, or forfeiture provisions of subtitle E or of any
other law of the United States pertaining
to the commodities subject to tax under such subtitle for the enforcement
of which the Secretary is responsible may –
(1)
carry firearms;
(2)
execute
and serve search warrants and arrest warrants, and serve subpoenas and summonses issued under authority of the
…
(b)
Enforcement of laws relating to internal revenue OTHER than subtitle E
(1) Any criminal investigator of the Intelligence Division of the Internal
Revenue Service whom the Secretary charges with the duty of enforcing any of
the criminal provisions of the internal revenue laws, any other criminal
provisions of law relating to internal revenue for the enforcement of which the
Secretary is responsible, or any other law for which the Secretary has
delegated investigatory authority to the Internal Revenue Service, is, in the performance of his duties, authorized
to perform the functions described in paragraph (2).
(2) The functions authorized under
this subsection to be performed by an officer referred to in paragraph (1) are
–
(A) to execute and serve search warrants and arrest warrants, and serve
subpoenas and summonses issued under authority of the
United States; … (emphasis
added)
Every person required to
deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter is hereby made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified against
the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(emphasis added)
If—
(1) any person, in violation of the provisions of
this chapter, fails to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter, and
(2) thereafter the tax against which such tax may
be credited is paid,
the tax so required to be
deducted and withheld shall not be collected from such person; but this section shall in no case relieve such person from
liability for interest or any penalties or additions to the tax otherwise
applicable in respect of such failure to deduct and withhold.
(emphasis added)
§ 636.
Jurisdiction, powers, and temporary assignment
(a) Each
(1) all powers and duties
conferred or imposed upon
(2) the
power to administer oaths and affirmations, issue orders pursuant to section 3142 of title 18 concerning
release or detention of persons pending trial, and take acknowledgements,
affidavits, and depositions;
(3) the power to conduct trials under section 3401, title 18, United States
Code, in conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section;
(4) the power to enter a
sentence for a petty offense; and
(5) the
power to enter a sentence for a class A misdemeanor in a case in which the
parties have consented.
§ 636.
Jurisdiction, powers, and temporary assignment (cont.)
(b)
(1) Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary—
(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter
pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the
pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or
information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an
action. A
judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph
(A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.
(B) a judge may also designate a
magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of
the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the
disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A),
of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal
offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.
(C) the magistrate judge shall
file his proposed findings and recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the
court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties. Within ten days after being served
with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed
findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. …
(emphasis added)