Thomas T. Scambos, Jr.

19400 Walnut Hills Rd.

Jeffersonton, Virginia 22724

 

 

Chief Justice John Roberts

1 First Street

Washington, D.C. 20543

 

 

APPLICATION TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE

OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT UNDER RULE 22

 

 

     The undersigned, Petitioner in Case Number 09-323, in which the Petition  for Certiorari has been denied, does hereby make this Application to the Justices of the United States Supreme Court in a final appeal for justice in these matters.  This application is particularly relevant to the Chief Justice, as the individual justice responsible for monitoring the events occurring in the federal courts within the Fourth Circuit.  

 

     The Petitioner in this case has been treated in an egregiously unjust manner by the members of the lower court judiciary.  He was fraudulently and unlawfully threatened by the magistrate with indeterminate imprisonment under color of law during the district court hearing held in this case, and was subsequently extortionately ordered by the Magistrate under color of office, to turn over property to the federal government, in an obviously prejudicially engineered predetermined outcome to the IRS Summons enforcement  hearing.

 

     The statutory jurisdiction of the district courts to enforce internal revenue Summons is identified in Title 26 U.S.C. Sections 7402(b) and 7604(a).  Title 26 U.S.C. Section 7604(a) plainly states:

 

§ 7604. Enforcement of summons

(a) Jurisdiction of district court

If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data.

                                                      (emphasis added)

 

And Title 26 U.S.C. Section 7402(b) similarly states:

 

 

§ 7402. Jurisdiction of district courts
 ….

(b) To enforce summons

If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.

                                                     (emphasis added)

 

 

     These statutes both make it absolutely clear that the jurisdiction of the district court over the enforcement of an internal revenue Summons is only established by the accomplishment of the specified “appropriate process”.  Both of these statutes invoke the same requirement of “appropriate process”, made necessary for the district court to hold jurisdiction.  

 

     That requirement of “appropriate process” cannot be accomplished unless all of the specific requirements of the controlling statutes regarding the issuance, service, and enforcement of an I.R.S. Summons are meticulously followed and obeyed by the United States, its agents and officers of the I.R.S., and the federal court judiciary, throughout the Summons enforcement process.

 

     The authority to Summons books and records is of course established in Title 26 U.S.C. § 7602.   However, theappropriate process” controlling the specific lawful application of those powers within the various Subtitles of the Title 26 Code, is specified in the code sections immediately following Section 7602, in Title 26 U.S.C. Sections 7603 through 7613.

 

     This case is marked by a whole series of inappropriate events, every single one of which constituted the destruction of the “appropriate process” required by law, necessary for the district court to subsequently hold jurisdiction to uphold any action of the magistrate or to enforce the disputed Summons, while evidencing and making very obvious the absolutely inappropriate behavior, in fact unlawful acts, committed by the district court Magistrate in this case, which have simply been “white-washed” in a cover-up of the Magistrate’s errors perpetrated by the district court bench.

 

     To briefly recount for the members of this honorable Supreme Court, the entire slate of unlawful and inappropriate acts committed by the Magistrate, the district court judge, and the I.R.S. Revenue Agent in the proceedings of this case:

 

1.  The Revenue Agent exceeded the authority of the written law granted to her employment position under Title 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a)[1], to serve a Summons only under Subtitle E, within an investigation pertaining to commodities subject to tax. The Revenue Agents knew beforehand that Petitioner is not, and has never been, engaged in any activity under Subtitle E, pertaining to commodities subject to tax.

2.  The Revenue Agent failed the statutory requirements of law under Title 26 U.S.C § 7608(b)1, to be a “criminal investigator of the Intelligence Division”  who is authorized thereunder to serve a Summons under Subtitle A, within an investigation pertaining to Subtitle A personal income tax, rather than “pertaining to commodities subject to tax” under Subtitle E.

3.  The Revenue Agent misrepresented facts and circumstances in her Affidavit, stating that she was investigating alleged “liability” for tax, but could not identify any established or even alleged liability in the Petitioner’s name (under Title 26 U.S.C. Sections 1461 or 1463[2]) at the hearing, and was not able to identify any other statute in the U.S. Code under which liability for tax in the Petitioner’s name might arise, or be alleged to be established or exist.  The Revenue Agent lied in her Affidavit about statutory “liability” for tax in the Petitioner’s name.  There is none that exists to investigate and, by previous correspondence with Petitioner, this was a known fact to the Revenue Agent.

4.  The Revenue Agent was not legitimately investigating a known, or even suspected, true or statutory liability for federal tax as sworn in her Affidavit, but was simply improperly using the Summons power to go fishing for earnings upon which to allege federal tax would be owed, once identified.   The Revenue Agent has never alleged any federal tax is actually owed by the Petitioner, or that any liability to investigate, actually exists, either in statute or in Petitioner’s name; or that Petitioner even engages in any taxable activity under Subtitle E that she is authorized to investigate!  This constituted an unlawful misuse of the Summons power by the Revenue Agent, which power, under Section 7608(a), is not legitimately used by a Revenue Agent, authorized to act under Title 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a), to go fishing for dollars OUTSIDE of Subtitle E. 

5.  The Revenue Agent, in committing these improper acts, and violating the granted limited authority of her employment position and office under Section 7608(a), violated and therefore destroyed the required “appropriate process as specified in Title 26 U.SC. § 7608(b), made necessary under Title 26 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a) and 7402(b) for the district court to subsequently hold jurisdiction over the enforcement of the I.R. Summons.   The Agent’s actions thus destroyed the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and the district court to subsequently address the matter, or enforce the I.R. Summons.

6.  At the district court hearing before the Magistrate, these questions of jurisdiction were raised by the Petitioner.  The Magistrate however, declared he did not understand the issues and arguments presented at the hearing by the Petitioner, but nevertheless, immediately ruled against them anyway, on the spot, without further consideration or investigation of the raised objection or identified jurisdictional issues.  The Magistrate clearly said to the Petitioner: “I don’t understand you”, and then ruled immediately against those arguments which he had just declared he did NOT UNDERSTAND, without making any further attempt to do so.  Now there’s justice for you, the Magistrate summarily rules: “I don’t understand you, and therefore you are wrong!”.   Is this the supremacy of REASON ?   Is this the rule of LAW ?  Is this the proper exercise of lawful judicial authority within the court and its proceedings?  Obviously not.

7.  The Magistrate then criminally tampered with the transcript of the Hearing, unlawfully deleting that portion of it where he had declared he didn’t understand the arguments presented by the Petitioner at the Hearing.   The Magistrate criminally altered the audio record of the hearing to attempt to cover up his improper and obviously prejudicial behavior towards the Petitioner in immediately ruling on arguments admittedly not understood.  The tampering with, and deletion of those statements from, the audio transcript of the hearing was obviously an illegal, criminal act, intentionally committed by the Magistrate to cover up his improper and prejudicial behavior towards Petitioner, and was an act that was egregiously prejudicial to the Petitioner’s rights, his case, the requirements of due process at law, the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Rules of the Court itself. This sort of judicial fraud violates all sense of human decency, morality, and integrity, and destroys utterly any pretense of judicial impartiality.   Is this now American Justice ?

8.  Next, the Magistrate failed and refused to write any report or recommendation as required by law under Title 28 U.S.C. § 636[3], thus violating the additional appropriate process required of the Magistrate to preserve the subsequent jurisdiction of the district court.  Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 clearly provides the true authority and lawful duties of the Magistrate judges in preliminary district court hearings.  The failure to adhere to the requirements of the appropriate process specified in statute to write a report, further destroyed completely the subsequent jurisdiction of the district court to address this matter.

9.  The Magistrate then erroneously invoked and misapplied an inappropriate corporate precedent, United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), to attempt to control the production of the Petitioner’s personal books and records and testimony.  The Petitioner is not a corporation without 5th Amendment rights to consider (see Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538 (1911)), before being ordering to testify or produce records in a potentially criminal investigation that, under Title 26 U.S.C. § 7608(b) is supposed to be conducted by a criminal investigator of the Intelligence Division”.  The fact that only a criminal investigator” is authorized by statute to Summons books and records and testimony within a Subtitle A investigation of liability for payment of the Subtitle A personal income tax, makes absolutely obvious the clear presence of the Petitioner’s Constitutional 5th Amendment Right to a protection from compelled self-incrimination in this Summons enforcement process.

10.   Then, at the preliminary district court Hearing the Magistrate improperly threatened the Petitioner with indeterminate imprisonment if he did not comply with the order of the court being issued by him (the Magistrate). This constituted an attempt to unlawfully intimidate the Respondent under color of office, as the Magistrate has no authority under these circumstances to either threaten imprisonment or to issue and enforce his orders as final Orders of the district court, which he improperly and unlawfully did in this matter, under both “color of law”, and again, “color of office”.

11.   Magistrates are not permitted to issue final Orders of the District Courts, Internal Revenue Code restricts the power to enforce a § 7602 summons to the district courts.  See I.R.C. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a); United States v. Wisnowski, 580 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1978), reh. denied, 585 F.2d 521.   A summons enforcement Order is a final dispositive and appealable order, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964), beyond the authority of a magistrate judge to issue.   United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 628 F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wisnowski, 580 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1978).

12.   The Magistrate then improperly tried to take advantage of the pro se litigant, and failed to provide the required Notice of special appeal rights and process as further required by controlling precedential ruling.   See Wells v. Shriners Hospital, 109 F.3d 198, 200-201 (4th Cir. 1997), and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-847 (4th Cir. 1985).  

13.   Color of law” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as:

 

“The appearance or semblance, without the substance, of legal right.  Misuse of power … but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of an official to be done “under color of any law”, the unlawful acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his official duties; that is to say, the unlawful acts must consist in an abuse or misuse of power which is possessed by the official only because he is an official; and the unlawful acts must be of such a nature or character, and be committed under such circumstances, that they would not have occurred but for the fact that the person committing them was an official then and there exercising his official powers outside the bounds of lawful authority. 42 USCA § 1983.

 

14.   The Magistrate clearly acted under color of law when he committed fraud by tampering with the audio transcripts of the testimony, and in unlawfully ordering testimony and evidence to be compelled from the Petitioner by allegedly final Order of the district court, without further review by the true district court bench, and without the Magistrate giving Notice to the Petitioner as required of appeal rights or special process.  These colorable acts were committed by the Magistrate while he deceitfully, improperly and illegally violated the written requirements of the law, and the controlling applicable case precedents, while he himself was committing prohibited acts under both color of law and color of office.

15.   Color of office” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as:


“Pretense of official right to do act made by one who has no such right … An act under color of office is an act of an officer who claims authority to do the act by reason of his office when the office does not confer on him any such authority…”

 

 

16.   “Extortion” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as:


“The obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C.A. § 871 et seq;
§ 1951”



17.   The Magistrate clearly committed extortion under color of office in unlawfully threatening to imprison the Petitioner unless personal property was turned over, because he has no authority to so act granted to him under Title 28 U.S.C Section 636.

18.    The Magistrate was also clearly acting under color of law and color of office by pretending to be personally empowered to issue orders as final Orders of the District Court when Section 636 clearly does not grant that power to him as a Magistrate under the circumstances defining this dispute.    

19.   These colorable acts were committed by the Magistrate, who deceitfully, improperly and in fact illegally, fraudulently misrepresented his true legal authority to the Petitioner, but which authority was not actually possessed by his magisterial office to exercise under either the circumstances, or the law, nor under the true controlling line of applicable case precedents. (See paragraphs 11 – 12 above, and 21 below).

20.   The Magistrate exceeded his lawful authority under Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 by issuing and enforcing his personal orders as a final Order of the district court, rather than writing a report and recommendation as required by (the above identified) law, and giving notice to the Petitioner of 10 days to object to the Magistrate’s report.  

21.    The extension of the Magistrate’s powers are not allowed.  A district court may not permit, and the parties may not consent to, extension of the power of the Magistrate to enter final judgment in an area where such power is restricted to the district courts. United States Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Bishop, 598 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1979).  Therefore, the Magistrate himself completely destroyed, by his acts, any subsequent jurisdiction of the district court, to subsequently rule in these matters.

22.   This conflicting line of controlling precedent have been erroneously and wrongfully ignored or overlooked by the district court bench, and has not been addressed by the Circuit bench members in their Opinion, or, now, by the Supreme Court in its denial of the Petition for Certiorari.  

23.   The Magistrate and the Revenue Agent clearly violated the required appropriate process necessary under the statutes for the District Court to have and hold jurisdiction to subsequently rule.

24.   Subsequently, after appeal to the district court of the Magistrate’s unlawful Order, the district court Judge violated the Rules of the Court himself, in order to attempt to prejudicially dismiss the timely filed appeal of the Petitioner.

25.   The true controlling precedents were well known to the district court as they are evidenced on the record of the proceedings in the original erroneous dismissal Order of the district court Judge, improperly dismissing the Petitioner’s appeal of the Magistrate’s actions and “order”.  

26.   When a violation of the Rules of the court was identified by the Petitioner and argued in Objection, the District Court Judge rescinded the erroneous dismissal of the Petitioner’s appeal, but then chose to begin inventing lies in a fraudulent story of false construction that was illegally subsequently used by the district court to replace the true facts of the case as already evidenced on the record of the proceedings.

27.    To wit: the court ruled that even though the Magistrate wasn’t himself allowed to issue Orders of the district court under the instant circumstances, and even though those unlawful Orders had already been improperly enforced on the Petitioner, the Judge was going to pretend the “order” issued by the Magistrate was really a report, and that now, after the “order” had already been enforced on the Petitioner, the Court would allow Objections;  AFTER THE FACT, as though enforcement had not already occurred, in an apparently new, absurd district court GAME (or fraud), called:LETS PRETEND IT NEVER HAPPENED” !   

28.   Of course, this “construction” of events, this pretense, was an absurd fraud perpetrated by the district court itself, in that it constituted a clear false construction of events that never actually occurred at all!   Since when do judges get to make up lies and false stories to be used in place of the facts of the case as actually evidenced and recorded on the record of the proceedings of the court?   Is this now American Justice, BY FRAUD?

29.   The Magistrate clearly and obviously, intentionally broke the law in order to attempt to ensure the government’s prejudicial, predetermined victory, and the district court despicably joined him, in attempting to cover-up of the crimes committed by the Magistrate, and effectively began committing them itself, through the clear abuse of its discretion.   And now the Fourth Circuit, and apparently the Supreme Court itself, appear to join the conspiracy to cover up the crimes and misdeeds of the members of the lower court judiciary.   Are you really all aware of everything that has occurred in this case, and are you actually going to try and approve it?

30.   The District Court bench never had jurisdiction to rule in this case because of the identified destruction of the required “appropriate process” by both the Magistrate and the Revenue Agent.

31.   The district court Judge however, also refused to address the obvious jurisdictional issues identified, and he refused to address the problematic, precedential issues raised in the written objections allowed to be submitted by the Petitioner.   The district court allowed the Petitioner’s objections, in fact invited them, BUT THEN REFUSED TO ADDRESS THEM, pretending rather that they didn’t exist and hadn’t actually been made.   ALL 50 OF THEM.

32.   The District Court Judge further refused to follow the true and well established controlling line of precedents regarding the limited authority and true statutory powers of the Magistrate identified by the Petitioner in Objection, which the district court judge himself had properly identified in his attempted initial dismissal of the appeal (see paragraphs 11-12, 21 above).

33.   The District Court Judge then erroneously and improperly invoked another inapplicable corporate precedent, First National Bank of Atlanta, 628 F.2d at 873, to reverse his previous holding, in order to be sure the government would again secure the predetermined outcome of another court victory.   However, that precedent also cannot be legitimately applied to the circumstances present in this dispute to control them, because the circumstances in that case were so substantially different from the circumstances present in the instant dispute, as to make that case irrelevant as a precedent to this one.

34.   In the First National case the erroneous and improper “order” of the Magistrate was discovered before that Magistrate’s “order” was enforced as a final Order of the district court, and before testimony was compelled, and before books and records were compelled to be turned over to the government. Unlike the present case where the Magistrate’s improper “order” had already been enforced when the impropriety of the Magistrate’s “order” was identified.

35.   Dissimilar facts and circumstances are not legitimately used by honorable courts and judges to control and dispose of dissimilar disputes.

36.   Finally, the Circuit Court inexplicably required the Petitioner to pay the appeal fees twice for this case.   Petitioner was made to pay the appeal fee of the Circuit Court two times, in order for the case to be heard just once.   

37.   Finally, the 4th Circuit Court, and now the Supreme Court itself, both refuse to address the clear and obvious conflict between the two conflicting lines of precedential authority invoked by the district court judge under First Nat’l in ignoring the actual ruling in law in that case and invoking and following the error.  In fact, he erroneously reverses his own correct holding in the rescinded dismissal Order, in order to again ensure a final outcome in the dispute that favors the government.   I repeat, the judge actually reverses his own correct ruling and cite of true controlling precedential lines of authority, in order to again make sure that ultimately the predetermined favorable outcome for the government is secured by the court, at any cost.

 

SUMMARY

 

     All of these improper acts, some plainly illegal, were committed by the judges handing this case in the lower courts.  The jurisdiction of the district court was destroyed, several times over by the actions of both the Revenue Agent and the Magistrate; the controlling laws were blatantly violated; false construction and fraudulent lies were invented by the court judiciary and substituted in place of the facts evidenced on the record of the court; and all the higher courts have to say is “Affirmed, per curiam”, and “Petition Denied”.  Would you accept that, if this had all happened to you?

 

     Is this now American justice? Administered by fraud, by mischief, by corrupt act, by intimidation, by threats of incarceration, under color of law, under color of office?  Do you think this type of behavior by the judges earns the respect of We the People when we encounter it in the official actions of the federal courts?  Or does it rightfully earn and deserve, only our contempt?

 

     This sort of obvious and insidious corruption within the judiciary, amounting to a clear and obvious conspiracy against the American People, and their Rights, brings to mind a familiar paragraph from the Declaration of Independence:

 

“But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism,”

 

 

     When it becomes obvious, as stated by Thomas Jefferson, that:  Single acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of the day; but a series of oppressions, … pursued unalterably through every change of ministers too plainly proves a deliberate, systematic plan of reducing us to slavery.”, then the People are justified in resistance through whatever measures are necessary to restore a dejure governance.    

 

     This facts of this case, as recounted above, are clear evidence of both corruption and a conspiracy in the lower courts, perpetrated by the Magistrates and certain district court judges to prejudicially predetermine the outcome of all I.R.S. Summons enforcement hearings, regardless of the true facts, regardless of the law, regardless of the evidence and true circumstances of the matter, regardless of the Rules of Evidence, regardless of the duties and the Rules of the Court, regardless of the rulings in the proper line of true controlling case precedents, regardless of the severity of the errors made, and, even apparently, regardless of the severity of any actual crimes committed by the Magistrates, like tampering with the transcript, threatening people under color of office and extorting property from citizens under color of law; and regardless of the protections and prohibitions proscribed by the Constitution of the United States of America addressing such behavior.   

 

     Such patent disregard for the written law by the federal magistrates and judges themselves is shameful and despicable, and deserves nothing but our contempt.  Criminal behavior, despicably engaged in by misguided members of the lower judiciary, should not be tolerated within the American judicial system by the higher courts, and certainly, irregardless of the higher courts, will not stand long in the light of day once exposed.   The Magisterial justices evidently no longer understand the concept of judicial impartiality, nor take serious their Oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States as the Supreme Law of the Land, superior to all other authority, despite and notwithstanding the statutes enacted by the Congress. 

 

     This blatant corruption demonstrated through this predetermined prejudicial proclivity to favor the government at every turn, and in every outcome, in I.R.S. Summons enforcement proceedings, routinely practiced now by the lower court Magistrates all across America, is despicable and absolutely contemptible.

 

     The higher judiciary’s failure to constrain its own members and uphold the Constitution in a timely manner, is rapidly tolling the American People’s patience with, and respect for, these federal Courts.  The federal courts are rapidly losing the respect of the American People and the longer these improper behaviors remain unaddressed, the more respect they are going to lose, until only a few people in America will care any more about what they say, because we will all know that the only real justice that comes in America any more, is the Justice that comes from God.  The higher courts know that they invite violence and anarchy by their refusal to constrain, reign in, and halt the unlawful acts of the members of the federal judiciary in the lower courts.  Recognition of this was most eloquently stated by Justice Brandeis in his Dissenting Opinion in Olmstead v. United States,  19 F. (2d) 842, 848, 850, affirmed (1928), which I am sure you are familiar with:

“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that, in the administration of the criminal law, the end justifies the means -- to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.”

                                                (emphasis added)

 

 

     Clearly these same fundamental principles of justice must apply, and be applied, to all of the court’s proceedings, both criminal and civil, and not just the criminal.  When the federal Courts repeatedly deliver prejudicial, predetermined outcomes, that provide unlawful powers on a carte blanche basis to the U.S. government and its agencies to exercise; to operate criminally under color of law, under color of office; to lie, to cheat, to defraud;  to unlawfully intimidate and threaten;  to extort, to rob and to steal property and Rights from the good American People, all in the name of tax only, under color of law, while acting only under color office; then obviously indeed, they (those courts)  have vacated their position of moral authority and have truly become the problem in America, and no longer can be relied upon by the American People as an impartial forum providing honest and dejure solutions to our legal disputes with the government; meaning other mechanisms must be found to serve as such, because as it was so eloquently pointed out Justice Brandeis: “If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. 

 

     This specific case herein appealed, is a complete and total judicial sham, and the conduct of the Charlottesville federal district court bench in these proceedings is a complete mockery of justice that invites anarchy.    This case represents nothing but a complete criminal cover-up of the injustices committed by the Magistrate, and it exposes an on-going federal judicial fraud operating under the guise and pretense of law, in name of tax only.  It clearly demonstrates a complete and total lack of honesty, integrity, morality, sense of duty, respect for the written law, and compliance with the mandates of the law, on the part of the Magistrate and the other federal judges involved.  The federal magisterial justices have obviously become mere executive branch puppets of the Justice Department and the I.R.S., who dance on command for them at these hearings, and who no longer represent an independent, impartial and dejure application or administration of the law.   

 

     This case is clear evidence of an obviously biased and corrupt judiciary attempting to unlawfully cover up the extent of the Magistrate’s misbehavior and corruption, and the prejudicially predetermined nature of the outcome of the IRS Summons enforcement hearing.  

 

     It is also now quite apparent and clear to me that the federal courts, including both the circuit courts and now apparently the Supreme Court itself, are all willing to cover up these colorable acts of the magistrate and district court, in order to try and prevent this colorable, defacto method of operation, being routinely employed in the district courts all across America, from being discovered, exposed, and halted once and for all.

 

     If the Revenue Agents are going to be allowed to violate the law; if the federal judiciary of the lower courts is also not going to obey the written law; if the district courts are going to be allowed to threaten, to extort, to lie, to cheat, to defraud, to deprive rights and extort property from the good American People, in the name of tax only, under color of law and Office; and IF the higher appeals circuit and Supreme courts are not going to prevent or interfere with those lower court magistrates and judges, and prevent them from engaging in this sort of obviously corrupt and improper behavior, thereby effectively supporting and joining in with the conspiracy to intimidate WE the PEOPLE and violate our rights; then WE The PEOPLE will have no other option left to take, but in the future to rely on the 2nd Amendment to defend our own private property and Constitutional rights ourselves, from the unlawful transgressions of both the lawlessness of our neighbors, and that of our own government as well.  

 

     It is hard for me to believe that is really what this Court wants to encourage and promote.

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

     It would appear from the events that have transpired in the instant matter that the lower courts no longer care about the written law, or the written limitations of the statutes imposed on the powers granted to the federal government to be legitimately exercised.  They appear to no longer believe in the rule of law, the proper invocation of applicable precedent, or the constitutional philosophy providing for a representative government of limited, specifically enumerated powers that are written in law, and that are not to be exceeded, abused or misused by members of the government or its employees in carrying out their lawful duties.   And worst of all, the higher courts as well, seem to be just fine with that abdication of duty by the lower courts!   But, as it was so plainly stated by Justice Field in his Opinion in the Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co. case:

 

“As stated by counsel: ‘There is no such thing in the theory of our national government as unlimited power of taxationThere are limitations, as he justly observes, of its powers arising out of the essential nature of all free governments; there are reservations of individual rights, without which society could not exist, and which are respected by every [legitimate] government. The right of taxation is subject to these limitations.’ Citizens' Savings Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall 655, and Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487, 1 Sup. Ct. 442.”   Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 599 (1895)

 

                                           (emphasis [and bracketing] added)

 

 

 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

 

 

 

The foregoing considered, the pro se Petitioner prays this Honorable Court will grant this extraordinary appeal by special application, and address this matter and correct the improper behavior of the members of the lower court judiciary as appropriate, and make Petitioner whole again.

 

             

 

                      Respectfully submitted,

 

 

 

 

                                                                                                                 _____________________________

                      Thomas T. Scambos, Jr.

                      19400 Walnut Hills Rd.

                      Jeffersonton, VA 22724

                      Petitioner, pro se

                      (540) 937-3098

 

 

 

Attached Exhibits:



§ 7608. Authority of internal revenue enforcement officers.

 

(a) Enforcement of subtitle E and other laws pertaining to liquor, tobacco, and firearms 


Any investigator, Officer, or other internal {Job Title} by whatever term designated, whom the Secretary charges with the duty of enforcing any of the criminal, seizure, or forfeiture provisions of subtitle E or of any other law of the United States pertaining to the commodities subject to tax under such subtitle for the enforcement of which the Secretary is responsible may –

 

(1)         carry firearms;

(2)         execute and serve search warrants and arrest warrants, and serve subpoenas and summonses issued under authority of the United States; 

(b) Enforcement of laws relating to internal revenue OTHER than subtitle E

(1) Any criminal investigator of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service whom the Secretary charges with the duty of enforcing any of the criminal provisions of the internal revenue laws, any other criminal provisions of law relating to internal revenue for the enforcement of which the Secretary is responsible, or any other law for which the Secretary has delegated investigatory authority to the Internal Revenue Service, is, in the performance of his duties, authorized to perform the functions described in paragraph (2).

 

(2) The functions authorized under this subsection to be performed by an officer referred to in paragraph (1) are –

 

(A) to execute and serve search warrants and arrest warrants, and serve subpoenas and summonses issued under authority of the United States;                                                                                                                                           (emphasis added)


 

§ 1461. Liability for withheld tax

Every person required to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter is hereby made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

 

                                             (emphasis added)

 

 

 

§ 1463. Tax paid by recipient of income

If—

(1) any person, in violation of the provisions of this chapter, fails to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter, and

(2) thereafter the tax against which such tax may be credited is paid,

the tax so required to be deducted and withheld shall not be collected from such person; but this section shall in no case relieve such person from liability for interest or any penalties or additions to the tax otherwise applicable in respect of such failure to deduct and withhold.

 

                                  (emphasis added)

 

 


§ 636. Jurisdiction, powers, and temporary assignment

 

(a) Each United States magistrate judge serving under this chapter shall have within the district in which sessions are held by the court that appointed the magistrate judge, at other places where that court may function, and elsewhere as authorized by law—

 

(1) all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners by law or by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts;

(2) the power to administer oaths and affirmations, issue orders pursuant to section 3142 of title 18 concerning release or detention of persons pending trial, and take acknowledgements, affidavits, and depositions;

(3) the power to conduct trials under section 3401, title 18, United States Code, in conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section;

(4)  the power to enter a sentence for a petty offense; and

(5) the power to enter a sentence for a class A misdemeanor in a case in which the parties have consented.

 

 

 


§ 636. Jurisdiction, powers, and temporary assignment (cont.)

 

(b)

  (1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary—

 

(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

 

(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.

 

(C) the magistrate judge shall file his proposed findings and recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties.  Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. …                                        

                                  (emphasis added)


 



[1] See Appendix I

[2] See Appendix II

[3] See Appendix III